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1. Prefatory View 
Of all the issues in the general theory of language usage, speech act theory 
has probably aroused the widest interest. Psychologists, for example, have suggested 
that the acquisition of the concepts underlying speech acts may be a prerequisite for 
the acquisition of language in general, literary critics have looked to speech act 
theory for an illumination of textual subtleties or for an understanding of the nature 
of literary genres, anthropologists have hoped to find in the theory some account of 
the nature of magical incantations, philosophers have seen potential applications to, 
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notions  of  speech  act  theory  as  variously  applicable  to  problems  in  syntax, 
semantics,  second  language  learning,  and  elsewhere.  Meanwhile  in  linguistic 
pragmatics, speech acts remain, along with presupposition 
1 and implicature
2 in 
particular, one of the central phenomena that any general pragmatic theory must 
account for.  
Given the widespread interest, there is an enormous literature on the subject, 
and this paper is not meant to examine all the work within linguistics, let alone a 
small fraction of the technical literature within language philosophy. 
2.  J.L.  Austin’s  Brand  New  Ideas  –  A  Huge  Step  ahead  Logical 
Positivism. From Austin to Searle 
To start with the very beginning, one might notice that issues of truth and 
falsity  have  always  been  of  central  interest  throughout  much  of  the  literature 
focussed on deixis
3, presupposition and implicature. Indeed those issues derive 
                                                            
1 The term points out what a speaker or writer assumes that the receiver of the linguistic message 
already knows. 
For example: 
   speaker A: What about inviting Simon tonight? 
   speaker B: What a good idea; then he can give Monica a lift. 
Here, the presuppositions are, amongst others, that speaker A and B know who Simon and Monica are, 
that Simon has a vehicle, most probably a car, and that Monica has no vehicle at the moment. Children 
often presuppose too much. The may say: 
...and he said “let’s go” and we went there. 
even if the hearers do not know who he is and where there is.  
2  This  linguistic  concept  is  connected  to  conversational  maxims  i.e.  those  unwritten  rules  about 
conversation  which  people  know  and  which  influence  the  form  of  conversational  exchanges.  For 
example in the following exchange: 
A: Let’s go to the movies. 
B: I have an examination in the morning. 
B’s reply might appear not to be connected to A’s remark. However, since A has made an invitation 
and  since  a  reply  to  an  invitation  is  usually  either  an  acceptance  or  a  refusal,  B’s  reply  is  here 
understood as an excuse for not accepting the invitation (i.e. a refusal). B has used the “maxim” that 
speakers normally gives replies which are relevant to the question that has been asked. The linguist and 
philosopher Grice has suggested that there are four conversational maxims: a). the maxim of quantity: 
give as  much information as needed; b). the maxim of quality: speak truthfully; c). the maxim of 
relevance: say things that are relevant; d). the maxim of manner: say things clearly and briefly. The use 
of conversational maxims to imply meaning during conversation is called conversational implicature, 
and the “co – operation” between speakers in using the maxims is sometimes called the co – operative 
principle.  
3 The concept of deixis points out those words or phrases – called deictic – which directly relate an 
utterance to a time, place or person. 
Examples of deictic words in English are: 
here and there, which refer to a place in relation to the speaker: 
The letter is here. (near the speaker) 
The letter is over there. (farther away from the speaker) ŒCONOMICA 
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much of their interest from the way in which they remind us of the strict limitations 
to  what  can  be  captured  in  a  truth  –  conditional  analysis  of  sentence  meaning. 
Nevertheless  in  the  1930s  there  flourished  what  can  now  be  safely  treated  as  a 
linguistic and philosophical excess,  namely  the  doctrine of  logical  positivism,  a 
central tenet of which was that unless a sentence can, at least in principle, be verified 
(i.e. tested for its truth and falsity), it was strictly speaking meaningless. Of course it 
followed that most ethical, aesthetic and literary discourses, not to mention everyday 
utterances, were simply meaningless. But rather than being seen as a reductio ad 
absurdum, such a conclusion was reviewed by proponents of logical positivism as a 
positively delightful result (see the marvelously prescriptive work by Ayer (1936))
1, 
and  the  doctrine  was  pervasive  in  philosophical  circles  of  the  time.  It  was  this 
movement  (which  Wittgenstein  had  partly  stimulated  in  his  Tractus  –  Logico  – 
Philosophicus  (1921))  that  the  later  Wittgenstein  was  actively  attacking  in 
Philosophical Investigations with the well known slogan “meaning in use”, and the 
insistence  that  utterances  are  only  explicable  in  relations  to  the  activities,  or 
language – games, in which they play a role.  
It was in the same period, when concern with verifiability and distrust of the 
inaccuracies and vacuities of ordinary language were paramount, that J.L. Austin 
launched his theory of speech acts. There are strong parallels between the latter 
Wittgenstein’s  emphasis  on  language  usage  and  language  games  and  Austin’s 
insistence that “the total speech act in the total speech situation is the only actual 
phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating.”
2 Nevertheless, 
Austin  appears  to  be  largely  unaware  of,  and  probably  quite  uninfluenced  by, 
Wittgenstein’s later work, and we may treat Austin’s theory as autonomous. 
In the set of lectures that were posthumously published as How to Do Things 
with Words, Austin set about demolishing, in his mild and urbane way, the view of 
language that would place truth conditions as central to language understanding. His 
method was this: 
First, he noted that some ordinary language declarative sentences, contrary 
to  logical  positivist  assumptions,  are  not  apparently  used  with  any  intention  of 
making  true  or  false  statements.  These  seem  to  form  a  special  class,  and  are 
illustrated below: 
                                                            
1 Ayer, A.J., Language, Truth and Logic, Victor Gollancz. London, 1936 
2 Austin, J.L., How to Do Things with Words, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962 ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                       Nr. 1/2006 
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 (1) I bet you six pence it will rain tomorrow 
I hereby christen this ship the H.M.S. Flounder 
I declare war on Zanzibar  
I apologize 
I dub thee Sir Walter 
I object 
I sentence you to ten years of hard lobour  
I bequeath you my Sansovino 
I give my word 
I warn you that trespassers will be prosecuted 
The peculiar thing about these sentences, according to Austin, is that they 
are not used to say things, i.e. describe states of affairs, but rather actively to do 
things. After you’ve declared war on Zanzibar, or dubbed Sir Walter, or raised an 
objection, the world has changed in substantial ways. Further, you cannot assess 
such utterances are true or false – as illustrated by the bizarre nature of the following 
exchange: 
(2) A: I second the motion. 
B: That’s false.  
(3)A: I dub thee Sir Walter. 
B: Too true. 
Austin  termed  these  peculiar  and  special  sentences  performatives,  and 
contrasted them to statements, assertions and utterances like them, which he called 
constatatives. 
He  then  went  on  to  suggest  that  although,  unlike  constatatives, 
performatives cannot be true or false (given their special nature, the question of truth 
and falsity simply does not arise), yet they can go wrong. He then set himself the 
task of cataloguing all the ways in which they can go wrong, or be infelicitous as he 
put it. For instance, suppose I say I christened this ship the H.M.S. Flounder, I may 
not  succeed  in  so  christening  the  vessel  if,  for  instance,  it  is  already  named 
otherwise, or I am not an appointed namer, or there are no witnesses, slipways, 
bottles of champagne, etc. Successfully naming a ship requires certain institutional 
arrangements, without which the action that the utterance attempts to perform is 
simply null and void. On the basis of such different ways in which a performative 
can fail to come off, Austin produced a typology of conditions which performatives 
must meet if they are to succeed or be felicitous. He called these conditions felicity 
conditions, and he distinguished three main categories: ŒCONOMICA 
 
  183
(4) A. (i) There must be a conventional procedure having a conventional 
effect; 
(ii) The circumstances and persons must be appropriate, as specified in the 
procedure. 
B.  The procedure must be executed (i) correctly and (ii) completely 
C.  Often,  (i) the  persons  must  have the requisite  thoughts,  feelings  and 
intentions, as specified in the procedure, and (ii) if consequent conduct 
is specified, then the relevant parties must do so 
As  evidence  of  the  existence  of  such  conditions,  consider  what  happens 
when some of them are not fulfilled. For example, suppose, a British citizen says to 
his wife: 
(5) I hereby divorce you 
He  will  not  thereby  achieve  a  divorce,  because  there  simply  is  no  such 
procedure (as in A (i)) whereby merely by uttering (5) divorce can be achieved. In 
contrast in Muslim cultures there is such a procedure, whereby the uttering of a 
sentence with the import of (5) three times consecutively does thereby and ipso facto 
constitute a divorce. As an illustration of a failure of condition A (ii), consider a 
clergymen baptizing the wrong baby, or the right baby with the wrong name, or 
consider  the  case  of  one  head  of  state  welcoming  another,  but  addressing  the 
attendant bodyguard in error. As for condition B, the words must be conventionally 
correct and complete. Finally, the violations of the C conditions are insincerities: to 
advise someone to do something when you really think it would be advantageous for 
you but not for him, or for a juror to find a defendant guilty when he knows him to 
be innocent, would be to violate condition C (i). And to promise to do something 
which  one  has  no  intention  whatsoever  of  doing  would  be  a  straightforward 
violation of C (ii). 
Austin notes that these violations are not of equal stature. Violations of A 
and B conditions give rise to misfires as he puts it – i.e. the intended actions simply 
fail to come off. Violations of C conditions on the other hand are abuses, not so 
easily detected at the time of the utterance in question, with the consequence that the 
action is performed, but infelicitously or insincerely. 
On the basis of these observations Austin declares that (a) some sentences, 
performatives, are special: uttering them does things, and does not merly say things 
(report  states  of  affairs);  and  (b)  these  performative  sentences  achieve  their 
corresponding actions because there are specific conventions linking the words to ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                       Nr. 1/2006 
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institutional procedures. Performatives are, if one likes, just rather special sorts of 
ceremony. And unlike constatatives, which are assessed in terms of truth and falsity, 
performatives can only be assessed as felicitous or infelicitous, according to whether 
their felicity conditions are met or not. 
But Austin is playing cunning: given this much, he has his wedge into the 
theory of language and he systematically taps it home. Readers of How to Do Things 
with Words should be warned that there is an internal evolution to the argument, so 
that what is proposed at the beginning is rejected by the end. Indeed what starts off a 
theory about some special and peculiar utterances – performatives – ends up as a 
general theory that pertains to all kinds of utterances. Consequently there are two 
crucial sliding definitions or concepts: firstly, there is a shift from the view that 
performatives are a special class of sentences with peculiar syntactic and pragmatic 
properties, to the view that there is a general class of performative utterances that 
includes  both  explicit  performatives  (the  old  familiar  class)  and  implicit 
performatives,  the  latter  including  lots  of  other  kinds  of  utterances  if  not  all. 
Secondly, there is a shift from the dichotomy performative / constatative to a general 
theory of illocutionary acts of which the various performatives and constatatives 
are just special sub – cases. Let us take these two shifts in order, and review Austin’s 
arguments for the theoretical ‘sea – change’, as he puts it. 
If  the  dichotomy  between  performatives  and  constatatives  is  to  bear  the 
important  load  that  Austin  indicates,  namely  the  distinction  between  truth  – 
conditionally assessed utterances and those assessed in terms of felicity, than it had 
better  be  possible  to  tell  the  difference  –  i.e.  to  characterize  performatives  in 
independent  terms.  Austin  therefore  teases  us  with  an  attempt  to  characterize 
performatives in linguistic terms. He notes that the paradigm cases, as in (1) above, 
seem  to  have  the  following  properties:  they  are  first  person  indicative  active 
sentences in the simple present tense. This is hardly surprising, since, if in uttering a 
performative the speaker is concurrently performing an action, we should expect just 
those properties. Thus we get the contrast between the following sentences: only the 
first can be uttered performatively. 
(6) a. I bet you five pounds it’ll rain tomorrow. 
  b. I am betting you five pounds it’ll rain tomorrow. 
  c. I did bet you five pounds it’ll rain tomorrow. 
  d. He bets you five pounds it’ll rain tomorrow. 
The progressive aspect in (6b) renders that (most probably) a reminder, as 
does the third person in (6d), while the past tense in (6c) indicates a report; none of 
these  constatatives  seems,  then,  to  be  capable  of  doing  betting,  unlike  the 
performative (6a). ŒCONOMICA 
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Austin’s  work  is,  however,  not  easy  to  summarize  as  it  is  rich  with 
suggestions that are not followed up, and avoids dogmatic statements of position. Of 
the large amount of philosophical work that it has given rise to, one development in 
particular is worth singling out, i.e. the very influential doctrine of J.R. Searle. 
In general, Searle’s theory of speech acts is just Austin’s systematized, in 
part rigidified, with sallies into the general theory of meaning, and connections to 
other philosophical issues. Austin thought that one could come to an interesting 
classification through taxonomy of performative verbs, but Searle seeks some more 
abstract scheme based on felicity conditions. In fact, he proposes that there are just 
five  basic  kinds  of  action  that  one  can  perform  in  speaking,  by  means  of  the 
following five types of utterance: 
1. representatives, which commit the speaker to the truth of the expressed 
proposition (paradigm cases: asserting, concluding, etc.) 
 2. directives, which are attempts by the speaker to get the addressee to do  
something (paradigm cases: requesting, questioning) 
3. commissives, which commit the speaker to some future course of action 
(paradigm cases: promising, threatening, offering) 
4.  expressives,  which  express  a  psychological  state  (paradigm  cases: 
thanking, apologizing, welcoming, congratulating) 
5. declarations, which effect immediate changes in the institutional state of 
affairs and which tend to rely on elaborate extra – linguistic institutions (paradigm 
cases: excommunicating, declaring war, christening, firing from employment) 
To Searle, as with Austin, the illocutionary act is directly achieved by the 
conventional force associated with the issuance of a certain kind of utterance in 
accord with a conventional procedure. In contrast, a perlocutionary act is specific 
to circumstances of issuance, and is therefore not conventionally achieved just by 
uttering  that  particular  utterance,  and  includes  all  those  effects,  intended  or 
unintended, often indeterminate, that some particular utterance in some particular 
situation may cause.  
3. A Last Annotation. Instead of Final Judgment  
To squeeze all that goes under the label of speech act theory within the 
confines of a linguistic paper like this one would be not only impossible – as the 
numerous  volumes  dedicated  to  this  topic  could  not  cover  its  plenitude  of ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                       Nr. 1/2006 
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significance – but also undesirable. Consequently, this paper is quite conservative in 
scope  and  approach,  and  verges  upon  only  what  is  of  an  utmost  importance  in 
speech act theory. 
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